If you’ve followed this blog for any length of time, you will have noticed that the attack on Pearl Harbor is a particular interest of mine. Partly that’s because my father was there, and partly because it is a classic Indications & Warning problem, the bedrock of half of my professional military career. As per an old family tradition, we were watching the movie Tora, Tora, Tora this afternoon — that’s how one knows that it’s the start of Christmas season in our household — and some thoughts occurred to me about the technology available in those days, and its impact on military operations.
Pre-war military technology was primitive by our standards, or by immediate post-war standards for that matter. Communications were by telephone (if local, and you had to go through the operator first), or by hand-keyed Morse code over HF radio for long range communications, radio that was susceptible to degradation by fluctuations in the ionosphere. A submarine cable linked Hawaii with the Mainland as early as 1902, but it was low-bandwidth telegraphy only — there were no telephone cables until after the war. In the movie, when the military couldn’t get a signal through to Pearl because of “atmospherics”, they gave their war-warning message to AT&T Western Union for cable transmission as a telegram.
Similarly with radar. The Opana radar site had only been established ten days before the attack. The equipment used, the SCR-270, had been operational elsewhere on the island for about six months, but few people were trained in how to use it, and the chain of command was clueless on how to best employ it. In addition, the equipment did not operate the way radar does today. The user interface was crude, producing an oscilloscope display rather than the PPI scope of later systems.
There were a lot of issues with the limitations of the technology of the day. The interesting thing is that as primitive as the tech was, it was still new to the military, and they were still figuring out how to use it. One key shortfall was lack of a proper organization to handle the new capabilities. I will talk about that, and the lack of a proper war-fighting mentality when I write about Pearl Harbor again, next year.